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CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 FOREIGN AID
Foreign aidl is defined to be the financial resource flows from
the official agencies of the developed countries to the less-developed
countries and multilateral institutions. These flows meet the following
tests:2 i. they are administered with the stated intent to promote
economic development and welfare of le8s-develop~d countries
as their main objective;
il. their financial terms and conditions are intended to be
concesBional in character.
which is often considered 100% grants. on the other hand, the definition
This broad definition of foreign aid, excludes all military aid
~re prec1sely we !Dean"Foreign Econom1c Aid", howeV!!rwe will ref'er'to 1t a. "Foreign A1d" 1
n ahort.
2pearson, Lester B., partners in Develop!Dent,A Report of the commission on International Dey!!l me
... Yo<'.......< Po'. CooP.' ,'''. p. 14,.1". op 0'.
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includes other official bilateral transactions which have concessional
elements, e.g. Eximbank3 transactions which are export-facilitating in
purpose. In addition to official flows, the private sector of donor
countries extend various types of export credits and investments. How-
ever as these financial flows are primarily motivated by profit consider-
ations they are subject to free market conditions and therefore, in general,
do not have concessionary elements.4
Foreign aid has provided the essential external resources to many
less-developed countries which are plagued by a shortage of capital in
their development efforts. Foreign aid has financed about 10% of invest-
ment in the developing countries.5 However, small as it may seem, a
marginal difference of 10% in the investment level can mean the difference
between staying comfortably ahead of the population growth, or barely
keeping pace.
1.2 GRAl':T VALUE AND GRANT RA.T12
"Grant value" of foreign aid refers to that portion which accrues
to the recipient country due to the concessionary elements of the aid.
The remaining portion of foreign aid - foreign aid minus grant value -
is referred to as "loan portion" and it is to be repaid according to the
terms of the contract. Grant value of foreign aid will be higher or lower
according to the "hardness" or "softness" of the contract terms. An out-
right gift without the expectation of repayment of any kind, is clearly
100% grant.6 Alternatively, an export credit at the prevailing market
~ .
J Export-Import B~P~ of the united States.
4 However, semi_official Red-CrOSSand some non.·profi t private agencies ar e exceptions from this
generalization.
5 Pearson, Loe. cit.
6 Horvath, Janos, "On the Evaluation of Internal;ionlll Grants policy", l'llP
lic
Finane.!!.. No.2, 1971.
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rate of interest wl·thout conc~sSl'onaryconditl'ons t'~ con alns a ~ero percent
grant.7
"Grant ratio" will be defined as the ratio of "grant value" to
total aid, expressed in terms of either decimal points or percentage
points.
1.3 VIEWPO nITS
There are several viewpoints in the assessment of foreign aid.
The choice of any viewpoint determines the premises of the analytical
model one attempts to build. Therefore we will put the problem in
perspective by stating clearly what viewpoint we will be taking in this
research.
One approach to the evaluation of foreign aid may be the "world
economy" viewpoint. In this approach, the model may attempt to evaluate
the effect of foreign aid on the allocation of the world'S resources,
global income, etc. The model, for example, may shOW how the world's
resources are misallocated due to aid-tying. However, interesting as
it may be, this viewpoint is largelY academiC on the face of political
realities.
A second viewpoint is the evaluation of foreign aid from the
standpoint of recipient countries. In this "value-to-recipient"
approach, the model may shoW the effect of foreign aid on the recipient
country's balance of payments, investments, agricultural policies, etc.
This approach to aid analysiS is a burning issue and has been the
subject of many studies. Due to the complexity of the problem, a recent
study conducted by the world Bank8 Suggests a case-by-case study of the
7 Ibid.
8 Pearson, Op. cit., p. 23·
.~
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ment on the past policy practices.
recipient countries. The lIvalue-to-recipientll approach ::'sbeyond the
scope of this research due to its complexity.
A more popular viewpoint in aid analysis is the "cost-to-donor"
approach which will be the viewpoint taken in this research. In such
an analysis, a model is built to assess the cost of foreign aid to donor
countries. According to our definition then, the cost of foreign aid to
donor, in terms of resources sacrificed, is equivalent to its "grant
value" .
It may be well to point out the fact that the "value-to-recipient"
under the second viewpoint above is not necessarily identical to the
"cost-to-donor". As pointed out by Horvath,9 this is not a "zero-sum-
game".
1.4 PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to construct a quantitative tool
to evaluate the true "grant-ratio" of foreign aid and measure the
sensitivity of various contract terms. The use of the model, however is
not limited to the analysis of past foreign aid data. In fact, the pri-
mary objective of this research is to provide tools to policymake~ to
evaluate the different alternative policies of foreign aid. The model
may be utilized in:
i. the analysis of past foreign aid data to provide enlighten-
11. the trade-off of one contract term for another; for example,
how much does aid-tying increase the effective interest rate,:
9 Horvath, Loc. cit.
__ ......,,_..., __""=ai"'7""P...... ~FdE""==-...... 5"....=----...·-i' ""'------
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iii. providing quantitative answers to the existing or emerging
issues of foreign aid; for example, what is the impact of
the 10% cut in foreign aid, proposed by President Nixon ,
on the balance of payments position of the U.S.?
1.5 PROCEDURE AIm SCOPE
In order to accomplish the objectives stated above, the following
procedure has been followed in the thesis.
Chapter II of the thesis includes the development of the model
and the derivations of the sensitivity analysis formulas. The model and
the sensitivity formulas have been programmed on a digital electronic
computer for ease of computations. The source listing of this Fortran-IV
time-sharing program is shown in appendix-C.
Chapter III includes an illustrative example. The model has been
utilized in the analysis of the U.S. foreign aid data for the years 1960
through 1969. Appendix-A includes the computed results, and appendix-B
contains the foreign aid statistics.
Chapter IV summarizes the results of the research and draws
conclusions.
....
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CHAPTER-II
ANALYTICAL MODEL
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The contract terms and conditions which determine the "grant-·
value" of foreign aid are of two types: 1.) concessionary factors, and
2.) trade factors. concessionary factors are the financial conditions
on the loan, these are: grace period, maturity period, ani the interest
rates during the grace and maturity periods. The three primary trade
factors considered in this research are: "aid.-tying", "repayment-
currency" used, and "surpluS_commodities".
Each of these terms mentioned above will be discussed, assumptions
will be stated. and the model will be built in the ensuing sections.
2.2 CONCESSIONARY FACTOR£
Let (A) denote the total aid commit~ent, and suppose (G) denotes
the "grant-value" of the aid after accounting for all conccssionery and
trade factors. If "e let (g) represent tbe "grant-ratio" of the aid,
( 2)
-7-
then clearly;
g ",.Q...
A
(1)
g '"grant-ratio
G '"grant-value
A = total aid committed
Quite frequent.ly however, a portion of the total aid (A) consti-
tutes an outright gift or grant, such as, "technical assistance" expendi-
tures. Therefore, the remaining portion of (A) is the "loan portion".
If we le'twhich is to be repaid according to the terms of the contract.
(L) denote the loan portion of the aid, then our "grant-ratio" before
accounting for any other concessionary elements, becomps:
g '"grant-ratio
A = total aid committed
L '"loan portion of the aid
G '"grant-value of the aid
However not all of (L) is to be paid back, a part of (L) actually
constitutes grant due to the concessionary financial conditions of the
loan. The basic formula which calculates the discounted present value
of the loan (L) was first proposed by Ohlin
l
and recently expanded and
refined by Horvath.2 The formula will be stated below without proof.
(3)
v = v + VM T
tr = iM L (1 _ e-qH)
M q
= iT L e -qM + (1 _ iT)L (e -qM - e-
qT
)
V T q q q ('1' - M)
(4)
(5)
v = total discounted present value of loan (L)
V '"discounted present value of the interest payments
M .dur~ng grace yearsV = discounted present value of the interest and
T principal payments during the nongrace years
M '"mQratorium, or grace period, in years
T '"maturity period, in years
i = interest during grace, in decimal fraction
iM '"interest during nongrace years, in decimal fraction
qT.= comparative rate of discount (opportunity cost), in
decimal fraction
L id d pariS, O.E.C.D., 1966, p. 101-10
1
1.
-Ohlin, Goren, Foreign Aid polide• Recons e~,
2
Horva
th Janos and Donald P. Minase.iA.n,"The Proportion of True Grant in Foreign A1d: A Mathematical
Formulation" , 'MimeOg;aphed, Butler Univers1 ty. 1971.
present value (V). Then, the new grant-ratio will be given by:
(6)
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e ~ base of natural logarithm, 2.718
L = loan portion of the aid
This model assumes that the donor country could have chosen a
domestic investment project and reaped the opportunity rate of return (q)
compounded continuouSly.3 It is further assumed that only interest is
repaid during the grace years, and both interest and principal payments
are made during the remainder of the loan.
The (I,) in equation (2) needs to be replaced by its discounted
A - v
g = ------r-
g = grant-ratio
A = total aid commitmentV = discounted present value of the loan (L)
Where (V) in the above equations are given by equations (3, 4, and 5).
This last equation (6) incorporates all the concessionary elements
of the financial conditions into the grant-ratio formula.
2.3 TRADE FACTORS
As mentioned earlier, there are three primary trade factors which
influence the magnitude of the grant-ratio; these are:
1. aid-tying
ii. repayment-currency, and
iii. surplus commodities
Each of these factors will be discussed and incorporated into the
grant-ratio formula in the following sections.
2.31 Aid-Tying:
Tied-aid or credits come in varioUS forms, they are tied to:
4
L purchases in donor country; e.g., the recipient is required
to spend the total aid in the donor country,
3Horvath, op. cit., p. 3." A Q titati
ve
AnalysiS" in Capital Movementand Economic Deyelopment
"Haq, 1~8hbubui, "Tied_Credits - uan '
edited by John II. Adler. NeWYork. 1967, p. "'\z6.
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ii. individual projects; e.g., the recipient is required to
use the credits only for the completion of a specified
project.
iii. specific end uses; e.g., any other specific use, other than
projects.
In most cases, all three forms of tying are applicable. The most
important form, however, is country-tying which makes it difficult for
the recipient countries to take advantage of the cqmpetitive conditions
in the international market.5
often substantially above those in competitive world markets.
Aid-tying imposes many different costs on recipient countries,
6some of these are:
i. It requires them to purchase goods from donors at prices
ii. Tying of shipping and insurance in some cases adds further
to such direct costs.
iii. The utilization of tied-aid may involve imports and projects
of low priority, hence impedes development.
iv. Requires the recipient to maintain extensive import and
exchange controls, hence adds to the administrative over-
head.
v. Limits the ability of the recipient to choose an appropriate
technology or international consultants of its own choice.
vi. Domestic projects are over capitalized and considerable
difficulty is experienced in marketing their products in the
domestic or international markets.
5Haq, op. cit., p. 326-327.
6pearson, Lester B., Partners in Development, Report of the Commiaa10n on International Development,
N~ York, 1969, p. 172-175.
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In spite of all these costs however, tied-aid is preferable to
no aid. This is normally true, as tied-aid is often the only available
t . t '7source of financing large investmen proJec s.
The recent growth of aid-tying is closely liru~ed to the use of
aid for export promotion in increasingly competitive markets, but the
principal objective for certain donors, such as the U.S., has been to
8
protect their balance of payments.
Aid-tying is not without harmful effects to donors either; aid-
tying results in:9
i. inefficient industries ure bolstered anc resources are
misallocnted;
ii. trade patterns are distorted, markets dLsrupted;
iii. donor I s own reputation for competitiveness is undermined
in the international markets;
iv. donor's expressed preference for ·free ';rade is often in
direct conflict v,ith the discriminatory nature of aid.-
tying.
Due to increasingly. alarming proportions of tied-aid in recent
years, there have been several proposals made to reduce the effect of
aid-tying. Some of the principal proposals are:
1. It is recommended that donor countries form a "pool" and
untie their bilateral tied-aid henceforth offsetting each
others I previously captured markets. ThiS will result
in a net, "zero llalance-of -payments effect." for donors, and
furthermore provide a more competitive procurement market
for recipients.lO
7Ibid.
8Ibid•
9Ibid.
lOpearson. op. cit •• p. 191.
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i1. It is advised that recipient countries work toward a greater
diversification in the sources of credit to enlarge the
area of choice. AlthOUgh this may seem rather simple, this
is frequently the only practical alternative available to
.. t t· 11reclplen coun rles.
iii. Donor countries should advance an additional grant to cover
the difference between the international price and the
domestic price, Hnd treat this part as a grant to domestic
manufacturer.12
The lengthy discussion above indicates that the task of evaluating
the effect of aid-tying on the grant value of foreign aid is not
a simple
task. Nevertheless, we will proceed with the development of the model
by incorporating only the "pricing" effect of aid-tying into the model.
Aid t ... . d t " t· t,,13._ ylng lS sometlmes referre 0 as nega lve-gran Slnce this
practice reduces the grant value of foreign aid. The grant-ratio model
after incorporating the "pricing" effect of aid-tying becomes:
P
d
~ dohor's p~~ce indeX
Pw ~ world price index
OM f'ul'thG~ ~ltM'tC"\lli!l(! f 'II. l!I@~e~ abW~ l! @Q.. ~Q ~. ~!!diQ.t.~,
The d~teJ;"minat:Lon of the price indexes (Fd) and. (p) usua.l1y requires
-::1J/;fj~ .. ~~"'i:1M~ fj~1!i~S ~l:l~ Be-:.'~lIl'a.:L.~~nt'l'iMfi~iE'JlIl'iL~~ 1nl.1.~~~!:.lma~ nt7t if;'~;PJ:'esent
the true picture. This is be~e:uS€ tM/,;enel'lll l'iE'1 ~ 1nli~~eS Wt'~ ~as Ii
&~ c SII~ wn@r~M th@ ~1Jl'Qhases with tied-aid involves
~-
l~Iaq, op, cit., p, 33~.
;J.:lHII1'li gp, e1t;" ~, 332,
:r- __ ~H<:l~ii'tl'lj ;T!il'!f:jll, iin4 lilof[iiJJI }>'_ M1nil~dlifiL 11'f!_!e ~!:lprJrUofi ,,1' :!.'l'I!cfl~mt j;fl FIlf~L~nAil:dl
orl!!lUation" I Mimi!)tWll.pht<l, !l\itilcl' Ufi1vcrllU~j :LVll"
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industrial and investment goods. For example, Haq14 points out that in
a particular project items of iron and steel procured from the U.S.,
Pakistan was required to pay 40-5010 higher prices than the international
market. The differential consumer price index between the U.S. and the
competitive market, at that time, was less than 2010. Therefore, the
use of consumer price index will more likely underestimate the effect of
aid-tying. Nevertheless, on the face of lack of appropriate price index,
"consumer price index" will be used in the illusc;rative example in the
next chapter.
2.32 Repayment Currency:
Repayments may be made partly or fully in local currency. Other
things equal, the larger the part of repayment accepted in local currency,
t t 1 t Horvath
15 .he greater is the gran e emen . g ives a formula to compute
the effect of local currency payments on the gr:mt-ratio. Since the
local currency payments concerns only the loan portion of the aid, only
the (V) in equation (7) is effected. The new grant-ratio model incor-
porating the effect of local currency payments is stated below:
g
A - v* - kAt
A
v'tl. '" (1 - p + rp) V
r '"EflEs
(10)
Ef '" official exchange rate; amount. corresponding to $1.0Es = ~hauow exchange rate; amount corresponding to $1.0
r ~ ratio of the official cxchang e ro.te to the markc,t
exchange rate
p = that fraction of L to be repaid in local currency
v* = new discounted pr-esent value of (L) with local
currency payments incorporated
Th@ model aoove assumes that each interest and principal payment
is made with both local and hard currency in the rat i,oof (p).
14Haq, cp , cit., p. 330.
15Horvath. op. c1t., p. 6.
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2.33 Surplus Commodities:
For this factor, Horvath16 provides a generalized formula to
reduce the domestic, government supported price of sur}lus agricultural
commodities to export market values. The formula will be stated without
proof: (11)
g '"A - v* -kAlt- vAz._
A
Al '" (1 - z) A
D - K
v =- K Z 0= decimal fraction standing for the share of surplus
goods in the aid
A = non-surplus part of the aid
A~ = surplus commodity part of the aid
D- = world market price for the surplus commodity
K = per unit face value of the surplus goods shipped
v = deflator
2.4 GRANT COMPONENT..§.
After replacing intermediate notations, equation (11) will yield
g = A _ (1 _ P + rp) V - k (1 _.z) At - v'ZA
(12)
A
As noted in section (2.2), the total aid (A) consists of two parts:
a "loan position" (L) and the "outright gift" portion (A-L). The total
aid (A) then is identical to the summation of its two components:
A = "gift portion" + "loan portion" (13)
Replacing (A) in equation (12) by its identity, the equation (13),
and rearranging the terms of equation (12) will yield:
A E. (A - L) + L
(14)
(15)
g +
16Horvath, op, cit., p. 7-8.
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where V is a function of the variables· iI" .equations (3), (4), and (5). ' 'J ~'l" M, T, and q as given by
g % total grant ratio
g1 '"contribution of "outright gift" portion
g2 ~ contribution of the concessionary financial dit
t
.b ti • " con ions
g3 = can ra u on 01 repa.yment currency"
g4 = adverse effect of "aid-tying"
g5 = 8.dverse effect of "surplus-conunodity" sales.
Equations (14) and (15) therefore give the components of the
grant-ratio.
2.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The "sensitivity" of a mathematical function with respect to one
of its variables is defined as: the change in the value of the function
when a change (~) occurs in the variable.
17
This definition of "sensitivity" as we shall adopt here needs
clarification. Suppose (F) is a differentiable mathematical function
of three variables; X, Y, and Z as shown below: (16)
F = f(X,Y,Z)
when the variables X, Y, and Z are changed by ~X, ~Y, and.lZ amounts,
the ~F change in function F is given by:
.IF = f(X + .lX, y + /j.y, z + Il.Z) - f(X,Y,Z) (17)
If the changes ~X, AY, and AZ in equation (17) are reasonably small, then
.F ohange is approximately given by the total partial derivative
18
of
function F.
[SF] [SF] r.SFJ
.IF ';( UXJ/j. x + ·~Yfy + [sz /J.Z
(18)
We shall define the sensitivity of F with respect to X as the ch~nge AF
when X changes by .X while the other variables are constant (>Y " 0,
'Z "0). According to this definition then, the first term in equation (18)
17
Dorf
, Richard C., Modern control System., MoSS., Add!80o-We.1e
y
Pub. Camp., 1967, p , 63.
1~ap1un, W., Advanced Ca1cu1uB_,_M3BS., Addison-Wesley Pub. comp., 1959, p. 82-e5.
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becomes the sensitivity of F w.r.t.19 X. In a similar way, the sensitivity
of Y, and Z are the second and the third terms in eq_uation(18;.
Sensitivity of F W.l'.t. X
Sensitivity of F w.r.t. Y (20)
Sensitivity of F w.r.t. Z ( 21)
Sensitivities mayhave positive or negative signs depending em the
model. A positive sensitivity indicates that the change in the function
is in the same direction as the variable. In other words, an increase in
the variable will increase the function, or vice versa. A negative sensi-
tivi ty indicates that the changes in the variable and the function are in
the opposite directions. For example, an increase in the maturity period
of a loan will increase the grant-ratio of the aid, hence we expect that
the sensi tivi ty of grant-ratio with respect to mc.turity plriod will have
a positive sign. But an increase in the interes:, rate will decrease the
grant-ratio, therefore the sensitivity of grant-ratio with respect to
interest rate will have a negative sign, since the changes are in the
opposite directions.
Suppose we are interested in the "relative" weighting or importance
of the variables X, Y, Z rather than in their "absolute" magnitude and
direction. In other words, at what relative weighting do the variables
X, Y, and Z contribute to the total variation in the function (F),?
The relative weighting of X, Y, and Z in terms of percentage points are
stated below:20
RS = 100 \8;\
X VI
Relative Sensitivity of X (22)
19with respect to
20Deger. E., "Muthemattcal Models find Computer Lop;~c for the Reul-Time Process Control of Electronic
ASB~mbli~8". A l'Sc. Th~sis. Purdue Univ~r8ity. June 19btl. p. 28.
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RS = 100 \S;\
Y W
Relative Sensitivity of Y (23)
\ <,Z'\RS 100..2:__Z = W
Relative Sensitivity of Z (24)
w
1
~S;)2+ (S~)2+ (S~YT
2.6 SENSITIVITY OF CONTRACT TERMS
The concepts of "absolute sensitivity" and ":relative sensitivity",
briefly exposed in the previous section, will be ap~lied to the analysis
of the grant-ratio model, the equation (14).
It should. be observed that the contract t.erns , iM, i , M, T, and qT
are embedded in the intermediate variable (V) in equation (14). The
intermediate variable (V) in terms of these contract terms are given by
the equations (3), (4), and (5).
Absolute sensitivity formulas for the contract terms are listed
below:
Sensitlvit'y of grant-ratio to
interest rate during moratorium
period.
Sensltivity of grant-ratio to
interest rate during maturity.
SM =tSg 11'>1-1g 81-1
T =l~ 11'>TSg 8'l:
Sk =l~~11'>ks
st =l~~Jl'>tg
Sensitivi ty of gran~;-ratio to
moratoriumperiod.
Sensitivity of grar.t-ratio to
maturity period.
Sensitivity of gra~t-ratio to the
proportion of tiea-aid.
(30)
Sensitivity of grant-ratio to the
reduction in purcaasLngpower.
S.ensitivity of glant-ratio to the
fraction of aid to be paid in local
cur-r'encv ,
-17 - 1
r =[~~1 ~S g
"'z =l~; J tx z:0g
sq =l~~1 ~qg
Sensitivity of grant-ratio to the
ratio of EriEs.
Sensitivity of grant-ratio to the
fraction of surplus commodities.
(34)
Sensitivity of grant-ratio to the
dlscount rate.
The partial derivatives of some of the contract terms above can be
obtained very easily. For example, the partial dErivatives for k, p, and z
are given by:
(36)
(38)
The manual derivation of the partial derivatives of the terms,
iM, iT' M, T, and q_however become rather cumbnsome. Therefore, the
partial derivatives of these terms as well as t.ae others have been
computed by using the numerical differentiatior techniq_ues in the program.
The "relative sensitivities" of the contract terms can be computecl
in a similar way to eq_uations 22-25. In the aClalysis of the U.S. foreign
aid in the next chapter, relative sensitivities of six primary contract
terms, iM, iT' M, T, p, and k , have been compu.ted. Relative sensitivities
of these six terms must add up to 10010, as shJwn below:
RS. + RS + RSl-1 -I- HS, -I- RS -I- RSk = lOO '/0~M. iT r, p
In general, however, any group of variables can be chosen as a base.
The relative sensitivities of the contract terms indicate the
relative weighting or contribution of these terms to the grant-ratio.
Suppose, if the relative sensitivity of iM Ls 4~k (RSiM = 4010) and
the relative sensitivity of iT is only 2010; then we say that the interest
rate during moratorium is twice more important than the interest rate
during maturity period.
-16-
The study of the illustrative example in the next chapter will
clarify the meaning and the use of sensitivity formulas developed i.n
this chapter.
Table-l on the next page gives a summary of the notations used In
this chapter and their brief descriptions.
'"~
~§
o
(J
(J
al
~
~~.i .. .; .i
~~dada
IZ:
o
H
Eo<
'"H
".a...
..
t:Ioc
"E
-19-
CHAPTER- III
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF U.S.
FOREIGN AID: 1960-1969
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to illustrate the use of the "grant model" and the
"sensitivity analysis formulas" developed in the previous chapter,
the U. S. foreign aid data t'or the years 1960 through 1969 has been
analyzed. The following items have been computed for each year:
i. 'l'otal "grant-value" and "grant-ratio" of the aid;
ii. Components of the grant-ratio; 1.) contribution of gift
portion, 2.) concessionary financial conditions,
3.) aid-tying, and 1j.) repayment-currency toward the
total grant-ratio.
iii. Abs~lute sGn!liUviti!il~ ~:f' the ~:ra!1t~rIlI.t;l,otQ the contract
terms.
Table-2 on the next page gives the sUtfU'nar~' Of the e!oml'utatit:5filil
indiea:bed above.
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3.2 RESULTS
The highlights of the computed results in table-2 will be discussed
in the ensuing sections of this chapter.
Figure-l reveals that there is a considerable variation in aid
3.21 Grant-Value:
The U.S. foreign aid commitments and the corresponding grant-values
are shown in the first two rows of table-2 and the results are plotted in
figure-l, on page 27.
commitments in the 1960-1969 period. In spite of this variation however
the "grant-value" seems to be relatively more stable than the aid commitments.
The peak aid commitment in 1967 is primarily due to the SUbstantial
expansion in Eximbank loans as shown in table-B2. Since the Eximbank terms
are considerably harder than the other categories the grant-value did not
increase, in fact it has worsened in 1967.
3.22 Components of Grant-Ratio:
The componeJ;ltsof grant-ratio is given in table-2 and the plot is
shown in figure-2, on page 27.
As an example; in 1969, 35.20% of the aid was outright gift; 30.54%'
was grant due to the concessionary factors; 1.4('fl/o was grant due to local
currency payments; 6.9,1% was negative grant due to aid-tying. Therefore
the total grant-ratio was 60.22%1 (35.20 + 30.54 + 1.40 - 6.91 ~ 60.22%).
Figure-2 reveals that aid-tying has become a sig.nificantnegative
grant in recent years. Less-developed countries were required to grant
7.99% of the total aid in 1968 and 6.91% in 1969 to the U.S. domestic manu-
facturers via higher prices. However, as explained briefly in seotiQn 2.31,
loample manual computations for 1969 are sholln in ~ppe"d1X.!),
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the author feels that the effect of aid-tying has been underestimated by a
considerable amount in the analysis here due to the unavailability of proper
price index for investment goods.
The percent of aid tied has climbed up to 51. 5% in 1967 primarily
due to an unusual expansion in Eximbank loans which are 10Cf1/o tied. Aid-
tying has declined to 41.9% in 1969, however recent estimates indicate that
2approximately 90% of U.S. aid commitments in 1970 and 1971 have been tied
to the purchases in the U.S.
3.23 Absolute SensitivHy of Contract Terms:
The absolute sensitivities of the contract terms are given in table-2
and the results are plotted in figure-3, on page 28.
Absolute sensitivity of a contract term gives the "percentage points"
change in the grant-ratio when the term is changed by a given amount.
As an example consider the absolute sensitivity of "discount rate"
in 1969. The figure-3 or table-2 shows that the absolute sensitivity was
3.04%3 and the total "grant-ratio" was 60.2Z;h in 1969. What if the discount
rate was 8% rather than initially assumed value of 10%; by what amount the
grant-ratio would change? The answer is:
~g = sq x ~q ~ (+3.04%) x (-2%) = -6.08%
g
hence the grant-ratio under the 8% discount rate would be:
g ~ 60.22 + ~g = 54.14%
As another example, consider the interest rate during grace period
in 1969. Suppose this interest rate is decreased by 1.5% across the board,
then what would be the new grant-ratio? Since the absolute sensitivity of
the interest rate during grace is -2.82%3, the increasing effect of such
2Ja1on, Bimal, "Gains to Donor Countriee from Tied Aid" in Finance and Development, September 1969, p. 14-18.
3Samp1e manual computations for 1969 are shown in appendix-D.
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a decrease on the grant-ratio is given by:
iM
~g/ = Sg x ~iM = (-2.82%) x (-1.5%) = +4.23%
B = 60.22 + ~g/ = 64.4%
In the two examples above, the decrease in "discount rate" and
decrease in the "interest rate during grace" is considered to have taken
place independently. Next logical question is: what happens to the grant-
ratio if both of the changes happen simultaneously? The answer is: the
changes are computed independently as above and they are added linearly.
This is shown below:
g = 60.22 + ~g + ~g/ = 60.22 - 6.08 + 4.23 = 58.31%
Therefore the reducing effect of the decreasing discoupt rate on grant ratio
is partially offset by the increasing effect of decreasing interest rate.
The studies of this nature can be made with the use of "absolute
4sensitivities" on any number of changes within reasonable accuracy.
3.21l-Relative Sensi tivity of Contract 'l'erms:
Relative sensitivity of a contract term indicates the relative
The relative sensitivities of six primary contract terms are given
in table-2. These terms are: interest rate during grace, interest rate
during maturity, grace period, maturity period, percent of aid tied, and
percent of aid to be paid in local currency. These are the most important
contract terms in terms of their contribution to grant-ratio., However, in
general any number of contract terms can be chosen as basis and their
relative sensitivities can be computed.
weighting or contribution of that term toward the grant-ratio. For example,
4It should be pointed out that, the aBBumption here is thut the function behaves lin~arl;y within the region
of intereat. Therefore the computations with the absolute setlllitivitiesare at best an estimate-. In general. the
closer the proposed change 1n contract term to its initially ausumed value. the more accurate the computation. are.
Error is not significant within the region of interest. For example, when discount rate varies from 5i to l~. and
interest rate varies from Ii to fi'I" error in the grant ratio in onl;y lCf1,or less.
,-
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in 1969 the most important determinant of the grant-ratio was the "interest
rate during grace" with 46.30)0 relative importance. The second important
factor was the "interest rate during maturity" with a relative weighting
of 32.34%. The others in the order of importance were: "grace period" with
11.47%, "maturity period" with 4.62'/0, "aid-tying" with 2.71%, and "local
currency payments" with 2.57%.5
The study of the absolute and the relative sensitivities of the
contract terms provide an excellent tool to the policymakers of both the
recipient and the donor countries.
3.3 DLSCUSSION OF THE D~
The U.S. foreign aid data used in this analysis is shown in
appendix-B. The following qualifications apply to this data:
All military aid has been excluded due to our definition of "foreign
aid", as stated in section (1.1).
In addition to the official U.S. aid, the private sector of the
economy extends export credits and investments.6 These transfers have
been excluded from this analysis, since they are subject to free market
conditions and primarily motivated by profit considerations.
The data obtained for the surplus commodities is in export values
free market values - therefore they are not subject to the surplus com-
modi ties formula developed here. However, the aid given for the purchases
of the surplus commodities i.ssubject to all the other conditions of the aid.
A free market discount rate of 10% has been assumed in the computa-
tions. The choice of any initial discount rate is incidental, since the
new value of grant-ratio can be computed for any given discount rate by
~SlllDplemanual computations for 1969 are shown in appendix-D.
6
O.E.C.D., Resources for the Developing World, 1962-196fl, Paris, 1970, p. 220-223.
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making use of the sensitivity formulas.
The concessionary factors (interest rates, grace period, maturity
period) show considerable variations from one country to another country
and under different aid programs. Therefore, we computed the weighted
averages for each year, as shown in table-Bl.
In the computation of world price indexes, Gahwiler's7 approach has
been adopted. It is assumed that the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Canada, BJ1dJapan represent the bulk of the countries which could effectively
compete with the U.S. for those commodity expenditures subject to aid-tying.
The world price index colwnn in table-Bl is the average price indexes for
the aforementioned competitors for the years 1960 to 1969.
In the computation of average ratios of "official exchange rate to
shadow exchange rate" for the reci.pi.errtcountriE~, once more Gahwiler' s8
approach has been used. Due to the limited availability of data, three
countries; India, Pakistan, and Brazil are used in the calculation of the
ratio. These countries have represented approximately 65% of the PL-480
sales and 47% of other local currency sales. The relative weighting used
for these countries were: India 65%, Pakistan 21%, and Brazil 14%.
7Gahwiler. Carl J., "The Grant Component in the Udted States Economic Aid to Le aa-Deve Loped Countries",
a HSc. TheSis, Butler University, April 1971. p. 137.
auahwiler. op. cit., p. 138.
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CHAPTER- IV
CONCLUSIONS
4.1 SUMHARY OF THE PROCEDURE
In this resea.rch; first, a.model has been developed to evaluate
the true "grant-value" and the true "grant-ratio" of foreign aid. The
model accounts for the effects of the trade factors, such as "aid-tying",
"surplus-commodities", and "repayment-currency" as well as conventional
financial conditions. Second, a set of sensitivity analysis formulas
have been developed to measure the sensitivity of grant-ratio to the
contract terms of foreign aid. Third, and finally the model and the
sensitivity formulas have been put to use in the structural analysis of
the U.S. foreign aid in the 1960-1969 period.
In the introductory chapter we have stated that the quantitative
tool developed in this research can be used in; i) the analysis of past
foreign aid data; ii) the trade-off of one contract term for another; and
iii) the analysis of emerging policy decisions related to foreign aid.
---~,..........
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In the ensuing sections of this chapter, we will point out how we have
accomplished these three objectives.
1}.2 U .S. l"OREIGN AID IN PERSPECTIVE
One obvious use of the quantitative model developed here is the
analysis of past foreign aid data. Chapter III and in particular table-2
summarizes the results of the analysis performed on the U,S. foreign aid
data in the 1960-1969 period. Followings are the highlights of this
analysis:
IOn the average , 36¢ out of every foreign aid dollar in the 1960-
1969 period was outright gift e;iven by means of various programs; such
as, Peace Corps, Technical Assistance, etc. 37¢ out of Every aid dollar
was the implicit grant due to "softer" financial conditions; such as,
2lower interest rates than the free market rates, etc. Additional 2¢
per aid dollar has accrued to the recipients due to the existing differ-
ential between the official and shadow exchange rates of their currencies,
via payments of loans in their currencies. Howev er the recipients were
required to grant L.¢ out of every aid dollar to the U.S. domestic producers
due to aid-tying practices. Therefore, the total effective grant-value
of each U.S. dollar in this period was 71¢.3
The components of the "grant-ratio" have shown remarkable stabilj_ty
over thj_s ten-year period with the exception of aid-tying. The percentage
of aid tied has increased from 12.1% in 1960 to 41.970 in 1969.1} This
means that the recipients were required to grill1tl.05¢ out of every aid
dollar to the U.S. producers in 1960, and 6.9l¢ per aid d.ollar in 1969.
1 The avernge of the row 7 1n table ..2.
2 Free market interest rate or called "discount rate" han nasumed to be 10% throughout the period.
3 Total effecti vo value: 36 + 37 + 2 - I, c 71¢.
II See table-Bl.
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Recent estimates indicate that as much as 9afo of'the U.S. foreign aid
may be tied in 1971. 5 In the face of our findings here, this means
approximately 16.8¢ grant per aid dollar from the recipients to the U.S.
producers in 1971.6
By relative importance of contract terms, we mean their relative
contribution to grant-ratio. Relative importance of contract terms are
given by their "relative sensitivities" as shown in table-2. The ranking
of six major contract terms are: 1.) interest rate during grace period,
2.) interest rate during maturity period, 3.) grace years, 4.) maturity
years, 5.) percent of aid tied, 6.) percent of aid to be paid in local
currency. This ranking of the relative importance of the contract terms
have shown remarkable stability over the 1960-1969 period.
4.3 TRADE-OFF OF COn'rRACT TERMS
The model can also be utilized in the trade-off of one contract
term for another. Suppose we pose the following question: "If we are
to untie all the tied-aid, how much do we have to increase the interest
rate in grace and maturity so that the cost to donor will be the same?"
In fact, what is the same question is: "How much does aid-tying increase
the effective interest rate on the credit?"
Consider the U.S. foreign aid in 1969. The proportion of the tied-
5 Jolan, Bimal, "Gains to Donor Countries from Tied Aid", in finn"c,; and Development, September 1969, p.l!I-18.
6 This is c~mputed on the assumption thnt the structure of U.S. aid in 1971 is approximately the same as in1969, which is a conservative assumption since we know that the contract terms ore "harder" ruther than
"softer" in 1971. Under this nssumption, the contribution of aid-tying to the grant-rntio con be computed
as follows:
~g = s~ x (90'/, - 41.9%) = (-.17) x (1le.1~) =9.efff,
The totol effect, then:
g' = g + ~g = -6.91 - 9.86 = -16.e%
or 16.8¢ per aid dollar.
"-
aid in 1969 was 41.g/o.7 If we are to untie all the credits, then the
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proposed change in aid-tying is Llk = 41.9%. In order to compensate for
the reduction in aid-tying, we need to increase the interest rates by
Lli, so that the net change in the grant-ratio will be zero, Llg :=: O. The
unknown Lli can be computed as shown below:
Ak x Sk + .li
1M iT
x S + M x s '" ~gg g g
.lk = 41.%
~i ?
Sk -.17g
iM -2.82S
g
i
S T = -1.97
g
~
k x Sk
g (-41.9) x (-.17) _ 4%
(-2.82 _ 1.97) - 1.
"0
change in the proportion of aid-
tying
unknown change in the interest
rate
sensitivity of aid-tying, see
tab1e-2
sensitivity of interest rate
in moratorium, see tab1e-2.
sensitivity of interest rate in
maturity, see table-2
Therefore, the effective interest rate of the U.S. credits in
1969 was 1.49% higher due to aid-tying practices.
in a similar way.
Any other desired trade-off can be made among the contract terms
4.4 PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN AID CUT - ITS TRUE EFFECT
In his dramatic anouncement of the "new economic policy package",
on August 15, 1971, President Nixon proposed a lCP/oreduction in foreign
aid. The primary purpose of this reduction was to improve the ailing
balance of payments position of the U.S.
In the light of our research here, we intend to evaluate the true
position of the U.S.
quantitative effect of this proposed reduction on the balance of payments
7 See table-Bl.
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'The most recent estimates of the U.S. foreign aid commi-t.merrt.s in
1971 indicates that the total commitment prior to President Nixon's
announcement was $3,120 million.8 Therefore the proposed reduction in
foreign aid amounts to be $312 nri.Ll.i.on ,
In order to evaluate the true impact of this $312 million reduction
in foreign aid on the balance of payments position, the following assurnpt-
ions will be made:
i. The total amount of reduction will come from the credits
g1 = g Ah + Sk x (90 - 41.9)1;1'-'9 g
g1 ~ -6.91 + (-.17)x(90 - 41.9)
Sl = -6.91 - 9.86 = -16.&%
given at concessionary financial conditions.
ii. The concessionary contract terms9 in 1971 is similar to
the ones in 1969. This is a conservative assumption since
every indication is that the concessionary terms in 1971are
somewhat "harder" than the ones in 1969.
iii. Approximately 90% of the aid is tied10 in 1971 against only
41. 9% in 1969.
That portion of the aid which is returned to the U.S. due to aid-
tying via higher prices in the U.S. market is given by:
The proportion of the aid returned to the U.S. due to aid-tying
in 1969 was 6.91%. However an additional 9.86% will be returned to the
U. S. in 1971 due to increased aid-tying practices in 1971. Therefore
the total percentage of the aid to be returned to the U.S. dUE to aid-
tying alone is 16.8%.
8 Weekly World News Digest, Fact. on File, New Yor x, Fact. on File Pub. Inc., 1971, p. 293.
9 Interest rates in grace and maturity, grace period, and muturity period.
10 Jalnn, loco cit.
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Furthermore, a portion of the $ 312 million reduction would have
been paid back to the U.S. as interest and principal payments of the
loan over the maturity years. The assumption (ii) above enables us
to use the 1969 figure as an estimate for 1971; henceforth, the proportion
of the aid to be returned as interest and principal payments is 69.5%.11
The total proportion of the aid to be..;ret1).rnedto the U.S. due to
"aid-tying", plus "interest and principal payments" is therefore 86.3%
(69.5 + 16.8).
Therefore, in the long run, the net favorable effect of the proposed
foreign aid reduction on the balance of payments position of the U.S. is
only $L~3 million! 12
In this analysis, we have simply indicated the relationship between
the reduction in foreign aid and its true effect on the balance of payments
position of the U.S. under certain given assumptions. We will avoid passing
any judgment whether such a reduction was worth-while or not. In this
respect, we will tru~e the advice given by the distinguished economist
.w
Kindleberger, Professor Kindleberger stated once: "The economist must be
neutral ... at least in his professional capacity, and simply point out
what the relationships involved are in words as little loaded as possible.,,13
llsee table-2; the grant-ratio of the concessionary componentsin 1969 18 30.54%, therefore the amount
to be paid back is 69.5% (100 - 30.54).
12(l00j, - 86.3i) x $312 million is approximately $113million.
13Kindleberger, Charles P•• International Economicr.,Homewood,Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968,
p. 115. .
APPENDIX - A
PRDGRAM OUTPUT
GRANT AND SENSITIVITY COMPUTATIONS
TABLE-AI Grant and Sensitivity Computations; U.S. Aid, 1960-1969.
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U.S. AI0 1'960...., .
FOREIGN AID ANALYSIS PROGRAtt...............................
" 3"o5701.
s ZIf7;'091.
72.62 "
TOTAL I
TRA,JE FAC'rORS:
PER('(NT OF TOTAL AID TIED
PRICE UWE)( RAllO, jPH-PWI/PH I.)
PERCEI':'T CF AID TO BE PAID IN LOC. CURR.
RATIO OF (OFFIC. [XC.IY.KT ElI:C.) RATES ,.)
PERCENT OF SuRPLUS COMY.OO. IN AID
PRICE RATIO
OTHERS'
[STlMATEO DISCOUNT RATE
,-. WEIGHTED AVERAGESem) ... NOT APPLICABLE
GRANT VALUE
(.IN THOUS.)
GRANT RATIO
'IN PERC.)
'I 1655701.
So 7~7J:!O.
, 10~·~~7.
" . -J~BS2.
--NA--
-.e.62 "
21.91j. "
J.11 "
-1.05 •
--NA"-
'I 2..73097. 72.62 •
. SE':"SITIYITY ANALYS:S OF
CON,R~CT TERMS
ABSOLUTE RELATlVE
TERMS SENSlT IVITY SENSITIVITY'-------- ---_-_-_--- ---_- ...---- .......
".02 , -1.6 ..2 " 38.61 "
".02 " -1.6~O " ~6.6~ •
".-'2 YRS. 0.511 " 12.01.1 •
23.60 YRS. 0.27't- " 6 ....6 •
12.10 , -0.067 " 2.05 "
6.10 flo -O.l~l " ~-NA--
34.;:\0 • :J.091 " 2.1" "69.2:0 fI, -0.101 • --NA-'"
-NA-- _-NA __ --NA---11("'-- -NA.- .. -NA-'"
10.00 " 2.193 • -NA.-----~......--
TOTAL I 100.UO •
U.S. AID 191)1...............
FOREIGN 1.10 ANALYSIS PAOGR~M..............................
TOTAL 1.10 COMMITMENT ON THOUS.)
EQUl"ALENT GRANT VALUE lIN THOUS.,
GRA.NT RATJO (IN PERCENT) .
6~ANT COMpmltNlS :
GIFT PORTION
ooe TO CONCESSIONARY FACTORS
OVE TO LOCAL cunn , PAYMENTS
CuE TO AIO lYING
DUE TO SURPLUS COMMOD I TlES
DESCRIPTION OF .CONTRACT TERMS:
CONCESSIONARy FAe·TORS:
INTEREST RATE DURING GRACE ,.,
INTEREST RATE DURING MAllJRITY c.,
GRACE PERIOD Hi YEARS ,.)
MATURITY PERIOD IN YEARS ,.,
TRAOE FACTORS:
PERCENT OF TOTAL A IO nED
PRICE INDEX. RATIOolPH-Pw)/PH ,.)
PERCENT OF AID TO BE PAID IN LOC. CURR.
RATIO OF (OFFIe. EXC./Mt<T EXC.) RAiES ,_)
PERCENT OF SuRPLUS COM.'~OD. IN AID
PRICE RATIO
OTHERS:
ESTIMATED DISCOUNT RATE
·c.) "EIGHTED AvERAGES
.INA)~ NOT APPLICABLE
1127621",
3ZS"J96.
76.10 "
.~~AipYSl$ OF. GRANT C9~I;lQNENT$.
TOTAL I
GRANT VALUE
Ill'll TtiOUS.)
GRANT RATIO
ell'll PERC.I
s 16161N.
S 1"20671,).
, 10903,:,.
,. -9q291 •
....NA- .
1f2.5J •
33.2J •
2.55.
-2.21 "--N"--
76.10 •
SENSITIVITy ANALYSIS OF
CONTRACT TEj~I":S
ABSOLUTE RELATIvE
TERMS SENSITIVITY SE~SITlvITY---_ .._ .._---- -----..----- ----_.---- .._
2_'48 • -2.601 " 51.1f9 ,
2.58 " "'1.J71 • :27.13 "
7.0~ YRS. 1l.~8~ " 11.57 "
25.2'" YRS. 0.~09 • 6.12 •
21.00 • ...0.105 •. 2.06 "
10.5) " -0.210 • --NA--
Jl.~O " 0.061 • 1.61 •66.50 , -0.076 " ...-NA- ....
-NA-- --NA-- - ..NA--
-NA_ .... NA- ......NA .....
10.00 • 2.191 " --NA------..-- ..._--
TOTAL, 100.00 •
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TABLE-AI: Grant and Sensitivity Computations; U.S. Aid, 1960-1969.
(Continued)
Toro\L AID COMHlTM£NT (IN THOUS.)
EQUIVALENT GRANT VALUE I IN IHOUS.)
GRANT RATIO (IN PERCENT)
GIFT POIiTIOtJ
DuE TO CONCESSIONARY FACTORS
OuE TO lCCAL CURR. PAYMENTS
OUE TO AIO TYING .
DUE TO SURPLUS COMMODITIES
OESC~IPTION OF CONTRACT TERMS :.
CONCESSIONARV FACTOR5:
INTEREST RATE DURING GRACE ( ••
INTEREST RATE DURING ~ATuRITY (.)
GRACE PERIOD IN YEARS ($J
)il!ATuRJTY P[RlOO IN yEARS ,"',
TRADE FACTO~S:
PERCENT OF TOTAL. AID TIED
PRICE INDEX R ....TIO, (PH-P,O/PH , ...,
PERCENT OF AID TO BE PAID IN LaC. CuRRo
RATIO OF ,OFFlC. EXC./MKT·EXC.) R.UES (.,
P[RCENT OF SURPLUS (0"'11".00. IN AIO
PRICE RATIO
OH£RS:
ESn~ATED OISCOUNT RATE
c.) WEIGHTED ",vERAGES
CAAI .. NOT "'PPl.ICABlE
u.s , AID 1962
........ 10 ••••••••
FOREIGN "'10 A~II\l.YSlS PFWGRA,"I..................................
1J6~9..06.
31nZ07.
er.rs ~
GRAtH VAl..uE
lIN THOUS.'
'$. 1'11'."1/1').
$ lUSU.38S.
68619.
-93~U6.
--NA--
TOTAL , " J77J~07.
GI1ANT RATIO
(IN PERC.I
~l.::U ~
39.97 ,
1.91 "
-2.01 •
--NA--
ABSOLUTE
SENSITIVITY
RELATIVE
SENSn IvITY
SENSlTIVlry ANALYSIS OF
CONTR.ACT TEAMS
TERMS •
1.82 "
1~9Z "
6 • ."58 VRS.
. '2.26 VRS.
17.60 •
ll~'"O "
26.90 "
62.20 "
--NA--
--NA--
10.00 "
-2.9':13 "
-l.IHIl ,
0.50t "
0.223 "
~6~JO "
26.60 •
9 ... .1 "
".19 "
TOTAL AID CCWMtTMENT (]N THCUS.'
EOVlvALENT G~A~lT VALUE (IN THOUS.I
GRANT RATIO (IN pERCENil
GRANT _COMPONENTS I
GIFT PORTION
CUE 10 COrlCESSIONARY FACTORS
DuE TO LOCAL CVRR .. PAvMENTS
DUE TO AJD TVING
CUE: to SURPLUS COMMODITIES
OESCRIPTlOU OF CONTRACT tERMS ,
COuCESSIOfIAl~Y FACTORS:
IN1t:REST RATE DuRING GRACE , .. ,
INT£RES,T RATE CuRING MATURITV ,.,
GRACE PiRlOO IN YEARS ,.,
MATURITY PERIOD IN vEAAS C'"
TRAM fACTORS!
PERCf.NT OF TOTAL AID TIED
PRICE INDEX RATlOdPH-P",}/PH ('"
PERCENT OF AID TO OE PAID IN coc , CvRR.
flATIO OF (Of FIe. EXC./MKT EXC.) RATtS ,.,
PERCENT OF SuRP ....US COMMOO. IN AID
PRICE RATIO
OTHERS I
ESTIMATED DISCOUNT RATE
_ C") "EIGHTED AVERAGES
eN")- NOT APPLICABLE
u.s , AID 1963...................
FOREIGN AlO ANAU'SIS PROGRIH................................
J S ..,,72285.
• 3516579.
78.68 "
~~\-Y$J~_ 91:" GRAf'.H C9~I:'~P;I;~lS.--------- ...-..-------_ ..-----
GR"'NT YALVE
(IN THOUS.)
1"73~lS.
2071}.2,+2.
s 71039.
s· -105117.
--NA--
tOTAL I '10 '518579.
-0.114 "
-0.116 "
0.071 •
-c.osc "
--NA--
-NA--
2.1tt "
--NA,--
1.~'"--NA--
--IIIA----NA--
SENSITIVITv ANALVSIS OF
CO~TRACT TERMS
1.955 I; --111"'--
ABSOLUTE RELATIvE
TERMS SEtJSITIVITY SENSITIVITY----~---'l"---- -----_ .._--_ .. -----------
1.11 • -3.556 " 57.ttl •1.80 • -1.6J7 • 26 .... Z •8.5~ YRS. 0.581 • 9.J6 •32.62 YFlS. 0.254 I; ".17 •
2:!.60 • -0.10 ...• 1.6e "10.'0::1 • -0.226 , --NA-- .2:7.20 • 0.058 X O.'9tt •71.60 • -O.O~6 " --NII.--.. -1'.1.1."'- --NA- --NA--
--NA- -NA-- - ..N.....-
10,00 • 2.2'2 • --111",-----_----- .....-
TOTAl.1 1.00.00 •
TOTALI 100.00 15
GR"'NT RATIO
(IN PERC.)
;'2.9~ "
'06.'09 "
1.59 "
-2.3!5 I
--NA--
78.66 "
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TABLE-A1: Grant and. Sensitivity Computations; U.S. Aid, 1960-1969.
(Continued.)
V.5. AIO 196 ..........................
"OREIGN AID ANALYSIS PROGRAM.....................................
TOTAL AID to>'!~nM~Nj lIN THOUS.'
EQuIvALENT GRANT VALUE CIN THOVS.)
GRANT RAllO CIN PERCENT)
1 • Q363726.
$- 33qOJ81.
7{)'055 "
GRANT ~OMPONEtHS :
."~~I,.'!'SlS.9F GRh~T.c9MPONENrs.
GRANT I/ALUE
I IN THOUS.)
GRANT RATIO
(IN PERC.)___ .. .l_ ...... _
30.S" "
1.15.70 "
2.37 "
"'2.31 "
-"NA- ...
76.55 •
ABSOLUTE
SEt.SlTIVIT'f
-3.555 "
-1.111 "
0.753 "
0.205 "
~O.091 •
.. 0.260 "
0.092 "
-0.0(.0 "-N"-"-IIIA-':'
TOTALI
RELATIvE
SENSITIVITY
!S5.'n"
26.11 "
11.15 "
J.21 "
1.~2 "
-NA--
1."" ".....NA--__ A __
--m-
-NA-
lOU. 00 "
GIFT PORTION
DuE TO CONCE:SSICNARY FACTOR~
DUE TO LOCAL CuAR. PAYMENTS
Our: TO AID TYING
DuE TO SURPI..US COMMOOlTIES
TOTAL I
OEstFt'IPTIO~j OF CONTRACT TERMS:
CONCESSIONARY FACTORS:
INTEHEST RATE DURING GR~Ce: ,.,
HHEREST RATE DURING MATuRITy C.,
GRACE PERIOD IN yEARS (.,
MAluRI T'I' PERIOD IN YEARS till'
TRADE FAC.TORS:
PE~COlT OF TOTAL AJD TIED
PR1C( INDEx RATIO, (PH-i»IIJ)/PH (.,
PERCENT OF AID TO BE PAID IN i.cc , CURRo
RATIO OF HJFFIC. EXC./MKI EX.C.) RATES «.1
PEHCENT OF SURPLUS COM/'ilOO. IN AID
PRICE RA no
OTHERS!
Esn,.IATED DISCOUNT RATE
,.) wEIGHTED AVERAGES
(NA) ... NOT APPl.ICABLE
s 1;'51.5942.
10 '1')94:513.
, lU3J12.
s -103246.
..-r~A--
SENSITIvITY ANALYSIS OF
CONT~ACT TE.At'.S
TERMS
1.6~ "
2 •.92 "
B.ltS yns.
l ... J7 YRS.
26.00 "
9.10 "
2S. '10 I
60.10 "--NA-_
-1'4"-
10.00 •
u.s , AI0 1965 .................
'-OREION AID ANAl.YSIS PRJGRAH...................................
TOTAL AIO COMMITMENT (IN THOUS.)
[OUI vALErlT GRANT VALUE" ,IN ThOUS.)
GRANT RATIO (IN PERCENT)
S "Z'71391.
s 3J1012:!.
'77.50 "
GRANT COMPONENTS :
,A~"'lYSI$. QF GRAI;oIT. COIolPO'.;E"ITS
GRANT VALUE
tiN THOIJS.)
GIFT PORTION
DU( TO COtlCESSJONARY ~ACTORS
DUE TO LOC ....L CURR. PAYMENTS
DUE TO AIO TYING
CUE: TO SVRPLUS COMMODITIES
TOTAL
DESCRIPTICN OF CONTRACT TERMS J
CONCESSlONARY FAC-Tons:
INTEHCST RATE DuRING GRACE (.,
INTE.REST RATE OURIUG MATURITy c.,
GRACE P£m 00 lt~ YEARS (.)
MA1VRI Ty PERIOD IN YEARS (.)
TRADE FACTORS:
PERCENT OF TOTI\l. AIO TIED
PRICE INDEx RATIO, (PH-P:'(I/PH I.'
PERCENT OF 1\10 TO BE PAID IN LOC. Cl.'RF\.
RATIO OF IOFFIC. EXC./MKT exc.) RATES ,.,
PER(ErJT OF SURPLUS COMMOO. IN AID
PRICE" RATIO
ottte:Rsr
EST IMATEO OISCOUNT RATE
(II) IliElGHTEO AVERAGES
,NA)'" NOT APPLICABl.E
" 1J7~J)O.
~ 19116U6.
10 125064.
,. -134)76.
--NI\ ...-
.SEI';-ISlTIVITY ANALYSIS O~
CONTRACT Tr.R~5
GRANT RATIO
ON PERC.)
3~.15 "
"5.56 "
2.9' •
-3.15 "-"N" ..-
77.S0 ,.
AOSOl.UTE: RELATIVE
TERMS SENS I r rV lTY SEf.!SITIVITY--------_ ....._ ---- ..-------- ------------ ..
1.76 " -3.-.22 " 55.51.+ "
2.95 - -1.6114 • 26.20 "O.h9 YRS. o. '116 " 11.65 "35.55 YRS. O.U11 ,. 2.93 "
26.00 • -0.121 • 1.96,.12.2.0 • -0.260 ,. --N"--2'1.bO • 0.106 ~ 1.12 "52.lo0 • -1).06Z " --NA----UA,-- -NA.-- --NA--
--NA-'" ...-NA-" --NA-
10.(10 • 2.3 .. 5 " --NA"'------- ...----
TOTALI 100.00 "
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TABLE-Al: Grant and Sensitivity Computations; U.S. Aid, 1960-1969_
(Continued)
u.s , AI0 196h..........................
FOREIGN AID M~AlYSIS PROGR"'"...........~ "' "' .
TOT ....L AID COMMITMENT (IN THOU'S."
EQuIVALENT GRANT VALUE (IN THOUS.'
GRArH RATIO lIN PEHCENT]
I $ 507Q966.
to ~6616q7.
7Z.1S !II.
GRA~T CO~PONENT5 :
GRAtH VALUE
(IN THOU';;.)
GRANT RAilO
tIN PERC.)
GIFT PORTlON
DuE TO cor.CES510NARY FACTORS
OUE TO LOCAL CURRo PA.y,...ENTS
DUE TO A 10 Tv ING
DUE TO SURPLUS COMMODITIES
TOTAl.. I
OESCAIP'T ION OF ceNTRACT TERMS I
C()NCESSJOtll\RY FACTOHS:
INTEREST RATE OuRl""G GRACE (""
HJTEREST RATE: DuRING MA1URITY t.)
GHAC( PERIOD IN YEARS (.)
t-tATuRIT'f PLRIOD Hl yEARS (*,
TRADE FA€TCRS:
PE~'ErH OF TOTAL AID TI[O
PRICE INDEX RATIO. {PH-Pw)/PH (*)
PERCENT CF AlO TO 8[ PAlO IN LOCo CURRo
RATIO OF (OFFIC. ExC./MKT ExC.) RATES ,.,
PEACE!'.:T C;: SURPLUS COI"l"';oo .. IN AID
PRICE RATIO
OTHERSl
ESTIMATED DISCOUNT RATE
c., _EIGHTEO AVERAGES
tNAI- NOT APPLICABLE
10 184q14;'!.
" 1910~99.
'S 100649.
" -202:::93.
--NA--
36.35 •
37.01 "
1.tJ& ,
-3.99 "
--NA-"
SENS1TIVITY ANALYSIS OF
CONTRACT TE~MS
ABSOL,uTE RELATlvt
TERMS SENSITIvITY .SENSITh'ITY_-- ..--------- -_- .._- ..---- ----------
2.41 • -J.109 t 51.57 •3.38 , -1.700 " 28.33 "
7.S'} yAS. 0.746 " ll.38 ..
31.20 'fRS. 0.224 • J.71 •
30.90 • -0.129 " 2.1"' •12.90 • -0.309 " -NA"-
17.60 • O.l1J .. 1.67 "56.10-0 • -0.045 JI. --NA----NA-- --NA-- "oo:NA--
-NA-- --NA-" .....NA--
10.00 • 2.~a7 • --NA-----------
TOrM-1 100.00 •
v.s , AID 1961.................
FOREIGN AID ANALYSIS PROGRAM..................................
TOTAL AID COMMlT~ENT lIN THOUS.)
EOUIvALENT GRANT VALVE (IN nrous.,
GRANT RAT 10 (IN PERCENT)
61'91011:1.
3"11948.
!lS.l1 "
GRANT COMPQI\I£NTS :
.... ~LYS;$. OF GRANT CO~;?ONENTS
GRANT VALUE
(IN TtIOUS.1
GRANT RATIO
,I.N PERC.)...-....... _:.._ ............. _-_ ...
GIf"T PORTION
DUE: TO conCESSIONARY FACTORS
DUE· TO LOCAL CURRo PAYMENTS
DuE TO AID TYIrlG
DUE TO SUA:PI..USCO~MOOnI[S
TOTAL I
OEseRIPT lOt; OF CONTIU,CT TERMS:
CONCfSSIQtIAH'f FACTORS:
INTfHEST RATE DUfUNG GRACE ( .... )
INTEREST RATE DURING MATURl1v ,.,
GRACE peRIOD IN 'fEA.RS (.1
t>1A1UfHTY PEHIOD IN yEARS (.)
lRAOE FACTORS:
PERCENT OF TOTAL AID TIED
P~UCE WOEX RATIO, (PH"'P't.")/PH ( .. ,
PERCHH OF AID TO DE PAID IN t.oc , CURRo
RAilO OF (OFFlC. EXC./MKT EXC.) RATES (.)
PERCENT CF SURPLUS COMMOO. IN AID
PAIC[ RAHO
OTHERS:
ESlll"':A.TEO DlSCOUNT RATE
( .. , \;'EIGHIED .\vER1.GES
CNA., ... NOT APPLICABLE
s 1700<:!96.
" 2008118.
~ 162660.
$ - ..~91.26 •.
-NA--
27.""6 "
32.lt~ "
2.6' •
-7.42 "_riA-_
SENSITIVITV ANALYSIS OF
CONTRACT TERMS
AOSOLUTE RELATIVE
l(R~lS SENS IT I V ITY SENSITlVIH-----_ ...---- _ ..__ .....---_ ... _ ....._--------
J.7;) • -2.922 " ~ij.16 ~",.;)7 • -2.130 • 32.1'.1 ..~.6q YA-S. 0.618 " 13.27 •
21l.63 VAS. 0.3"1 • ~.15 "
51.50 • -O.14lt • 2.18 "l~.'tO • ..0.515 " --NfI--13.00 • O.20~ ~ 3.C~ •
..9.60. " ...0.052 • .....NA-
--111.1."- --NA-- --N.II.--
--NA- ..
__ N.t.__
--NA--
10.00 • 3.;)5S .. --N ....-----_ ..----..-
TOT AU lUO.OO •
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Grant and Sensitivity computations; U.S. Aid, 1960-1969.
(Continued)
TOTI\L AID CO~MlTlI.fNT lIN THOUS.)
EOuIVALENT GRAHl 'IALU£ (IN THOUS,)
GI~AIIT HArIO (HI PEACEtlTJ
E • S2~500~~
, ~ 29l?719J.
56.62 ~
GRAUl COt-'.I-'or~EfHS :--...---------------
GIFT paP:T rm~
OLJE TO cor,CESSIONARY FACTORS
DuE TO LOCAL CGRR. PAYMENTS
DuE TO II;:D T'l'It,G
DvE TO SURPLUS CO~r-:OOITIES
TOTAL I
DESCRIPTIO!I OF CONTRACT TER~5 :--- ...-----_ ..----------------------
COtIC[SSICI;r.R'f FACTOfIS:
HH[~[5T P.f,TE Duntt;G GRACE f"'l
ItlTEREST RATE OUIUNCi MATURITY' pA')
GRACE PERIOD I/~ YEARS c·)
MATVRI TY P(RI<'O IN rEflns I·'
TRADE: FA(;TCRS:
PEtlCEt:T Of. TCTAL AID TIED
FJldCE IIlU[X HATIO,(t>JI-pwl/PH (.,
PfRcnlT cs AID TO [JE PAID IN LOC. CURRo
~ATlO cr (OFFIe. (1«(./",,,,1 (YoC.' RATES (til)
r[~c01T or SUHt'LVS co~,~:OO. IN- AID
pRIcE R~TIO .
OTHERS:
EST1"'~T(D DISCOUNT RATE
t "') IKE IGH'rEO .\VERAGES
IWI,) - nor APpLICABLE
ABSOLUTE
RELATIV~
TERMS
SENSITIVITY
SENSITIVITl'
-_ ..-...---_ .....-- ------------- -------------
3.Cb ~ -" .lt~q "
qtt,tlS ,
It.l0 • _2.003 ,
'0.73 I
6.~8 'fA!;·
0.66J "
10.11 "
~6.nn yR!;.
O.2~<) "
~.59 "
..5.140 • _0.176 "
2. "0 S
11.60 • -O.4!..iij "
- ..N.'\--·
1,.60 1
0.192 • 2.9:i •
49.40 • -0. 052 •
--NA--
__ NA-'"
__w\--:- .._N"--
_NA--
__ NA--
__NA--
10.00 •
3.285 "
--NA--
...---_ ..----
TOTALI
100.00 •
U.S. AID 1960.... ~ ,. **
FOREIGN AlD ANALYSIS PIIOGRAM............................. ,.".....
MJAL ySIS OF GHflNT COMPCNENTS---_ ..-----_ --------_ --
GRI\,rlT VALUE
(IN niOUS.'
. --------------
" llfrlml18.
~ 17t',J~fl1.
t. IJO!.iOO.
" _1I2J092.
__NA"-
-------------
t. 2.91}779J.
SENSITIVITY ,ll.Nn-USI!; OF_ .._------- ------- ..--_ .....--
CONTRACT T[R~S----------------
GRANT RATIO
(IN PERC.)---_ ..--- ....-
?B.Jl ,
J,).68 t;
2..62 "
.. 7.99 "
.. -NA ......--_ ...-------
56 .• 62 "
U.S. ~IO 1969................
FOREIGN AID MJr.LYSlS PR)GRAM............ " ~ .
TOTAL 1110 CO...:r-:ITv.fNT (IN THOUS.'
EOUIVALENT GRANT vALUE t IN THOUS.'
GRI.rH RATIO tIN PERCE;tH)
S ~7l\9192.
I t. 2282017.
60.22: "
ANAL.ystS Of GRANT ccp.:PO:,jEN:~_..-...._ .......-..--_ ......-.......------
C;RI',tlT co~pmjENTS :-..._ ..-------------
GIFT PORHON
DuE TO cOtJCESSIONAR'r' FACTORS
DuE TO LCCAL CURRo PA'r'",OlTS
DuE TO 1\10 TYIt;G
DuE TO SURPLUS co,.V100
lT1ES
lOTAL J
D[SCJUPTION OF CONTRACT TEI~""S :--_ ......__ ._ ...__ ...---_ ......- ..._--------_ ..._ ..
CONC[SS~;.~~\:~S~A~!~~S~UAIrJG GRACE {.jot
IIIT£f.\£5T RATE OUIH!\'G ,,,,,TURITY (.,
GfV\CE prrllOO Jrj· YEAf~S (.,
MATURITY PERIOD IN YCARS I·'
TRADE FA(;TORS:pf.Rcn:T oF" TOTAL AID TIED
PfUC£ rr:O[X' flAllD. IPH-P~)/PH ,_, cuRRo
PEiK£NT OF AJD TO OE PAID EINCLiCRI\TES ( .. ,
RATIO CF plfFIC. Exc.I"'·I"·T :(.
PERCENT cF SuRPLUS COHMOD. IN 1\10
PRICE R~TIO
OTHERS: ESTIMATCD DISCOUNT RATt:
GRANT VALUE
(Hi .THOUS,'
..-;-;;;;~;~:..--
s 1151195-
s 5Z91~.
~ _261°lJ6•__ NA--
--~";;;;~.~1:""
SENSITIVIT1' MJI\LYSIS OF
-----~~~~~;~;-;~~;;,~------
............ _ ..----_ ..--
TERMS_ ..----------
;,.71 !'!.
ij.ll. J;
6.0~ yRS.
26,9~ yRS,
Ql,90 "
16.50 "
tl.90 "
SIf.ZO 11$
.._NA ....
.._NA-"
GRANT RAfIO.
(IN PEnc,)_ ..---_ ...-..--
;'S.20 ,
;:10.54 "
1.~O. "
_1')091 "
__ NA--
AOSOLUTE
SENSJTI"lTY------------
RELATIVE
SENSITIVITY------------
_2.aZl "
_).971 •
0.699 ,.
0.281 "
"6,J::l "
;:12.'" •
!l.tH"
Q.tJ2 "
_0.165 "
...o,lt19· "
0.lti7 "
_o.OJO "__NA-"
~...r~A-"
2.11 "
...-NII--
2.!)7 ".
--NA--
.....NA--
_NA .....
_-NA-_------ ..------
(., ,",'EIGHTED AV"[R"GE"S
(NA1- NOT APPLlCAI:lLE
Source: Table Bl
-39-
1
---
APPENDIX - B
U.s. FOREIGN AID AND CONTRACT TERMS
1960 - 1969-
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SAMPLE MANllA1 COMPUTATIOI§..
The computations in thiS research haye been excluSiyelY carried
out on a time-sharing computer.
this appendix
The following sample computations in
have becn performed manuallY in order to illustrate the
For example. the results shOwn under the "1')69" CO lumn in table-
2
on page 21 may be computed manuallY- The necessary input data for the
camputations
~orking of the model.
listed in table-Bl on page 40 is shown beloW:
l£put Data, 1969:
~ = $3,789,192
. '"$2,455,318
J.M '" 3.71:10
~'r : 4.14%
T :::6.05 yrs.
- 26.94 yrs.
q '" 10.Oat,
p =89f,.
k = 4i.9%
t = .165
r = 54.~
z ., 0
Total Aid Committed, in Tho
us
, $.
Loan portion, in TheUS. $.
Interest During Grace years.
Interest During Non-Grace years.
Moratorium period, in years.
Maturity period, in years.
Discount Rate, in~'Percent of Local currencY pe;yJIlent
s
.
percent of Aid Tied.
Differential price RatiO
Ratio of EdEsProportion of SurpluS commodities.
( _qM _qT)e - e
~
~ent Value:The present value of the loan maY be computed with the equations
(3) and (4) on page 7 and repeated belOW:
i
VM = qM L ~ _ e -qM)
v
T
~ ~T L e-qM + ~ _ :T)L
v = v + VM T
10
0100
\\\\\
6
:_j.B
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e~qM '"e-·10 x .605 " .5461
e-qT = e-.10 x 26.94" .0676
'" ~ (2,455,318) (1 _ .5461) = 413,468
.0414 ( .0
414
) (.5
461
-.~
= _ (2,!f55,318) (.5tf61) + 1 - - ~ c. ,,<;\.10 .10 .10 (26.9
4 - 6.05)
'" 884,744
v
of Grant Ratio: are given by equations (14)
The grant-ratio and its components
(15) on page 13 and repeated beloVl:and
g = g +
1
gl = ~- 3,789,192 - 2_~ ---2Q
A - ~92 '".:21-
g2 = !::_::_Y = ~3-" :3055'4A 3,789,192 ~
"3 0 .(1 - r)V •. 089 (1 - .542~ • :ol4O
A ~,192 :,.;.;;.--
g4 - kAt ------A '"kt = (.419) (.165) '" ~
g '" g1 + g2 + g3 - g4
g = .3520 + 4 4 06.305 + ,01 0 -. 91
~ Grant-Ratio:
l
-49-
The comput.atton
of absolute sensitivity of the "proportion of
aid tied" ,
18 relativelY easy. The abSolute sensitivity formula for
this. contract term is given by equation (3
0) on page 16.
Sensitivity:
s~ c [~:Jfik
[~!J= -t + zt
= _ .165 + 0(.165)
Ak :c .01
Skq Z (_ .165) (.01) ~:= .ooi-7- ----
(Equation 36, page 17)
= _ ,165
The computation of the relative sensitivity of anY contract term
:reqU'l.:res the
computation of all the other contract terms. Therefore,
due to the
Sensitivity:
difficulty of manual computations, no samPle calculation will
be hs own here for relative sensitivities.
01'-·
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